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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
EUGENE THORPE BASSETT,
ARTHUR JEROME
PHILLIPS, and WILLIAM D.
MORRELL,
Defendants-Appellants.

Case No. 9918

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The appellants were charged and convicted with
attempting to escape from the U'tJah State Prison,
and appeal from a judgment of guilty of :the District Court of the Third Judicial District upon jury
trial.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The defendants were jointly tried in the Third
District Court for Salt Lake County of the ·crime
of attempted escape and of assault upon a prison
guard. They were found not guilty of the crime of
assault upon a prison guard but guilty of attempted
escape.
1
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
State contends that the conviction for attempt.
ed escape should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The respondent adopts the Statement of Facts
as set out in the appellant's brief, except submi ts
the following additional supplement:
1

AppelLants Arthur Jerome Phillips and William
D. Morrell had both received dates for conditional
termination by the State Board of Bardons 'to be·
come effective on April 19, 19'6'6. The order of the
Board of Pardons terminating their sentences effec·
tive on the a:bove-mentioned date was in effect at
the time of ~their a:ttempted escape. Appellant Eugene
(Thorpe Ba:ssett had not been given any termination
date, but was being held for expiration of sentence
(R 63, 64). At the time of the attempted escape
each appellan t was confined in the State Prison
pursuant to a sentence for the indeterminate period
of five years to life for the crime of robbery (R·63).
1

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE ~PPELLANTS WERE NOT SERVING LIFE
SENTENCES AT THE TI'ME OF THE'IR ATTEMPTED
ESCAPE WITHIN THE MEANING OF 76-50.:2, UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED 1953.

Each of the defendants in the instant case
was serving an indeterminate sentence of five years
2
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to life at the time of their attempted escape and
thl ir subsequent conviction for attempted escape,
although two of the appellants, Arthur Jerome Phillips and William D. Morrell, had been given prosp(lctiYP termination dates by the 'State Board of
Pardons. The appellants contend tha:t, since 'several
decisions of the Utah Supreme Court have held that
a sentence for an indeterminate per'iod, including
lifl\ is a sentence for the maximum term, they were,
therefore, serving life sentences and could not be
convicted of the crime of attempted escape. Mutart
\', Pratt, 51 Utah 246, 170 P. 67; Lee Lim v. Davis,
75 Utah '245, 284 P. 32'3, 76 A.L.R. 460; State v.
Roberts, 91 UtJah 117, 63 P.'2d 584; Cardisco v.
Davis, 91 Utah 323, 64 'P.2d 216.
1

1

Section 76-50-2, Utah Code Annotated 19'53,
provides:
"Every prisoner confined in the state
prison 'for ~a term less than life, and every
such prisoner, while in custody of the warden,
deputy warden or any keeper or guard in any
convict camp, or any other place where he
nu.y be at work or housed or kept while outside the state prison walls, who escapes or attempts to escape from such prison, ·convict
camp or place of work, or from any keeper
or .guard, or from any ather place where such
prisoner ma7 be kept, shall be imprisoned 'in
the state prison for a term of not more than
ten years; such second term of imprisonment
to commence from the time he would other3
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wis~ have be~n d~scharged from said prison.
· An 1n~ormation filed under this section shall
be filed 'in the county in which the alleged
offense is committed, and the case shall be
tried in such county, urrle'ss a change of venue
is allowed as provided by law."

This statute was enacted as part of the Laws of the
State of Utah at the time of statehood. Revised Statutes 1898, Section 4114. At the tim·e of its incorporation in 1898, it read as follows:
"Every pri'Soner confined in the state
prison for a term less than for life, who escapes, or attempts to escape therefrom, is
punishable by imprisonmenlt in the state prison for a term n'ot less than one year nor more
than ten years; said second term of imprisonment to commence from the time he would
have otherwise h!ave been discharged from
said prison."
The statute was amended in 1915, Laws of Utah
191'5, Chapter 3, Section 1, to expand the circumstances when a convict's escape would be deemed
escape from the prison ~o include convict camps
and other pJace'S of confinement attendant to the
State Prison. In addition, 1a clause was added relating to the procedural venue in such cases. No change
was made in the provision relating to the type of
person whlo was subject to convicti1on for es'cape at
the time of the enactment of the provision relating
to punishment for e'Scape in 1'898.
Robbery, the crime for which the appeUants in
4
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the instant case were confined, was punishable for
a pt•riod of not less than three year~s nor for more
than twenty years, at the time the escape statute was
enacted. Howevlll', the indeterminate sentence Law
wa~ not yet in effect. Offenses punishable by life
imprisonment at the time were murder, Revised
Statutl's 1898, Section 416:2, dueling, Revised Statutes 1898, Chapter 20, and rape, Revised Statutes
1898, Section 4217. These offenses were the only ones
for which a trial judge could directly impose a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. In 1913 the
Legisbture passed the indeterminate sentence law,
77-:~5-20, U.C.A. 1953, and provided that it should
become effective on May 12, 1919, Laws of Utah
1913, Chapter 100. This provided that the trial court
would no longer make a specific sentence, butt rather
the sentence would be indetermina1te, subject to the
power of the Board of Pardons to determine the
release date of the convict from the State Prison.
The essential question for determination by
thi~ court is whether the provision "term less than
life" as used in 76-50-2, U.C.A. 1953, should encompass those crimes which have a m'aximum limit
of life imprisonn1ent but are actually indeterminate
in nature. It is submited that it should not. At the
time of the enactment of the escape statute a specific term of imprisonment by the trial court for
life was necessary before an individual was serving
5
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a life sentence. The obvious intention of the Legislature was to make unnecessary the trial and punishment of individuais who were already under manda!tory sentence for the rest of their lives. Such,
however, is not the case with an individual who is
serving an indeterminate sentence, for several reasons. First, as a practical matter, these individuals
can be terminated at any time land usually are long
before they die in prison. Secondly, the indeterminate sentence, although being subject to a maximum
limit of life, is directed towards allowing the Board
of Pardons substantial flexibility in treating the
needs of any individual prisoner. Consequently, it
is submitted that wha:t the Legislature contemplated
by the provision in the escape sta!tute o'f a term less
than life was that 1a life term be a specific term,
and 'Consequently that only individuals serving life
sentences under first degree murder, dueling, kidnapping, etc., should be deemed as being inaividuals serving sentences of life imprisonment.
Conceding as above noted; that several Utah
cases have said that an indetermina\te sentence is
a sentence to the maximum term, in State v. Nemier,
106 U·tJah 307, 148 P.2d 32·7, this court had occasion to consider whether or not an individual who
was serving an indeterminate sentence for robbery
from five years to life was serving a life sentence
as that term was used in Section 103-7-12, U.C.A.
6
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HH:~, which made an ~assault with a deadly weapon

upon a guard subject to a mandatory death sentence.
In that case this court noted that a person serving
such indeterminate sentence W1as not serving a life
~entence within the meaning of the substantive statutP. The court stated:
"Our convict assault statute now 103-712 U.C.A. 1943, first appeared as Ch'apter
10: page 8, Laws of Utah 1909, it was prior
to the enactment of 'the indeterminate sentence
law, now Section 105-36..:20, U.C.A. 1943,
which first appeared as Chapter 100, page
192, Laws of Utah 1913. At that time the
court was required in 1all ,cases to pass a definite sentence within the limits provided by
the statute. Under the law as it then existed
a person convicted of a crime carrying a minimum penalty of less than life and a maximum
penalty of life, would not undergo a life sentence, unless the tria'l judge, in view of aN of
the facts and circumstances brought to his
attention, pronounced a definite sentence of
life imprisonment. Such cases were no doubt
comparatively few. But under 1the indeterminate sentence law, except in murder and treason cases, the trial court cannot fix a definite
term, but must pass sentence of imprisonment
for a period of not less than the minimum
and not more than the maximum provided by
h.w. Thus if all persons serving a sentence,
the maximum term of which is ror life, are
undergoing a life sentence under the convict
assault statute, the number of persons coming within that statute was grea:tly enlarged
by the enactment of the indeterminate sentence Lnv. If, however, we take the other view,
7
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t~a.t on~y

such persons who a~e serving a defnnte hfe term are undergoing a life sentence, then all cases under the indeterminate
sentence which carries a minimum of less
than life cannot poss1ibly come within the provisions of this statute, although some of them
might have under the law before the enactment of the indeterminate sentence law. The
argument that the death penalty was provided in this statute because there is no other
punishment that can be inflic!ted on a person
undergoing a life sentence is not tenable because the Board of Pardons can and does
commute death penalty and life sentences, as
well as those of less severity, and in considering. each case, the behavior of the applicant
while serving his lterm is an important fac~tor. 'The fact thrut the death penalty was made
mandatory indicated that this statute was 'intended to app ly to only the most hardened
criminals, and was ndt intended to be extended to an cases where the maximum penalty is
life imprisonment.
"In the recent case of State v. Walsh,
106 Utah 22, 144 P.2d 757, we held that an
indeterminate sentence of from one to ten
years, is not a sentence of not less than three
years, as that term is used in the habitual
criminal statute. Practically all of the reasons
there given for that decision apply with equal
force to the facts of this case. We therefore
hold that a person serving a sen.tence of .!rom
five years to life under our 1ndeterm1nate
sentence law, is not undergoing a life sentence
as that term is used in Sec. 103-7-12 and ~hat
this deeis'ion must therefore be reversed. Smce
the offense denounced in section 103-7-11,
U.C.A. 1943, would be an included offense
1

1
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within the offense denounced in section 1037-12, the case is remanded to the district court
for a new trial."
The same reasons applicable to the situation in
State v. Nemier, supra, and State v. Walsh. ].06
Utah 22, 144 P.2d 757, are applicable here.
The Legislat~ obviously intended that individuals be brought before the courts to determine
their criminal responsibility for escapes rather than
to have an administrative determination made by
the Board of Pardons. Close constitutional questions would rise on the horizon were th'is court 'to
hold to the contrary. .Nlthough the Board of Pardons
would undoubtedly have authority to extend the indeterminate commitment to whatever degree it felt
necessary within the maximum limrts of the sentence, the procedures attendant to court trial with
the right to jury trial and legal counsel make a court
procedure more compatible with due process of law.
It is submitted, therefore, that a narrow ·construction should be given the phrase "less than life," not
only for the purpose of maintaining prison discipline, but also for the benefit of the prisoner who
may be suspected or accused of escape, to make certain that he is, in fact, gu'ilty of the crime of e~scape
before his chance of termination is disregarded. A
substantial argument in favor of a narrow construction of the phrase "less than life" can be made
apart from the legislative and judicial considera9
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tions argued above, the most obvious reason being
that prison discipline and 'control are better maintained. Individuals serving indeterminate sentences
with life maximum are 'given cl'ear warning that
misconduct will result in judicial proceedings and
a firm sentence being imposed against them to begin
after the'ir present sentence ends. These factors contribute substantially to the internal discipline of
the prison and obviously must have motivated the
Legislature at the time of statehood.
In McCoy v. Severson, 118 Utah 502, 222 P.2d
1058, a peti:Uon was fi'led by a prisoner who was
convicted of the crime of robbery and the crime
of murder. The murder sentence was commuted to
25 years by the Board of Pardons, and the petitioner argued that the sentence should be deemed
to run concurrently with the sentence for 'the robbery convicti'on, since, if the murder sentence, which
was originally to life, had been deemed to run consecutiv~y to the robbery sentence, the prisoner would
be serving two terms of life imprisonment, one to
run subsequent to the other. This court analyzed the
legislative history !and concluded that there was nothing inconsistent between 'the statute requiring that,
in the absence of spe'C~ific direction, sentences run
consecutively, and the indeterminate sentence law.
The court made it clear that the indeterminate sentence law does not cover all situations. The court
stated:
10
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"The indeterminate sentence law does not
cover all situations. Here, the petitioner was
eonvicted of two distinct offenses and two
separate judgments .were imJ?osed: While the
board of pardons might require him to serve
for the du1·ation of his natural life under
the robbery conviction, there are situations
where the m1aximum term provided by law
for one sentence is not of sufficient length to
adequately puni'sh a defendent for committing numerous offenses. If the legislature intended that the indeterminate sentence act
should repeal the other provisions of the statutes dealing with imprisonment, i't did not
say so. * * *"
The court determined, based on certain Oalifornia
ca~es, that merely because an 'individual is under a
judicial sentence of life imprisonment he should
not be immune from punishment for subsequent
misconduct. This court, commenting on the California cases and adopting their reasoning stated:
"Similar reasoning is appl'ica:ble in this
case to establish that petitioner was not serving two sentences, each of which ·compelled
hin1 to be incarcerated for the rem,ainder of
his natural life. 'The Constitution and statutes
of this state provide that the board of pardons may 'commute punishments an'd grant
pardons .after convictions, in all cases except
treason and impeachments.' Section 6'7-0-1,
U.C.A. 1943, and Const. Art. VII, Sec. 12.
Under the authority of those enactments the
board of pardons was given authority to make
certain that \vhich was uncertain and to lessen the period of confinem·ent on life sentences. A realistic approach to the problem
11
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suggests that neither a sentence for life nor
a sentence of from five years to life means
~hat ~ defendant will serve his natural life
tn prtson There would have been no occasion
to permit the termination or commu ta'tion
of sentences if the legislature intended that
t~e ~terms could not be made les S. For al'l practical purposes, a sentence for life must be
considered in connection with the powers of
ltJhe board of pardon's to commute the sentence
to a fixed and shorter period. * * *"
The reasoning of the McCoy case is directly applicable to ~the instant circumstances. Certainly, as
a practical matter, a sentence to an indeterminate
term for 1ife 'is not a sentence to life imprisonment,
:and unless ~a specific life term is given, such as a
first degree murder, substantial reason exi Sts for
prosecuting an escape. It is submitted, therefore,
that the trial court's de termination that an indeterminate term of five years to life was not a life
term ~ithin the meaning of 76~50-2, U.C.A. 1953,
was correct.
1

1

1

1

1

POINT II.
APPELLANTS ARTHUR JEROME PHILLIPS AND
WILLIAM D. MORRELL HAVING BE'EN GIVEN CONDITIONAL TERMINATION DATES ON THEIR ORIGINAL INDETERMINATE SENTENCES BY THE
BOARD OF PARDONS 'WERE NOT SEHVING LIFE
SENTE·NCES AT THE TIME OF THEIR ATTE MPTED
ESCAPE.
1

The record discloses that two of the three appellants, Arthur Jerome Phillips and William D.
Morrell, had at the time of their a·ntempted escape
1

12
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received conditional termination dates from the
Board of Pardons. It was clear, therefore, that the
Board, having exercised its jurisdiction, had in effect limited their sentences to a term for years terminating in 1966. In su<!h an instance it is submitted
that the individual is certainly no longer serving a
life term within the meaning of 76-50-2, U.C.A.
1953, and consequen1tly, appellants Arthur Jerome
Phillips and William D. Morrell should not be considered as having been subject to 11ife sentences if
the cou1-t determines ~hat the respondent's argument in Point I of thils btief 'should be rejected.

CONCLUSFON
It is subm'i tted tha!t the Legislature did not
intend 'an individual serving an indeterminate sentence under law, even though that 'sentence may carry
a maximum limit of life, to be deemed to be an individual serving a term less than life as that provision is used in the statute making criminal, escapes from a State Prison. Proper judicial administration, statutory construction and sound reasons
of public policy dietate to the contrary. It is submitted the decision of the 'trial court should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

A.

PR~TT

KESLER

Attorney General

RONALD N. BOYCE
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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